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NOTES
CORPORATE STRUCTURE AS A FACTOR IN CONSERVA-
TION IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
Before the legal foundations underlying the problem of stabili-
zation of the petroleum industry may be approached, a number
of salient facts concerning the economic structure of that in-
dustry must be understood. If stabilization is to come at all,
the first question which presents itself is, at what stage, from
production to ultimate distribution, may control be exercised
most effectively? The solution to this problem may be simplified
greatly by a study of the internal structure of the petroleum in-
dustry. It is clear that if the industry presents a greater inte-
gration at one stage than at another, whether in production, or
in transportation, or again in refining, or in marketing, such
regulation could be exercised most effectively at that point with-
in the process. Whether this regulation should come in the form
of voluntary cooperation within the industry or externally by
governmental control, and the legal implications of either meth-
od of control, are questions which are left for subsequent treat-
ment.'
Certain outstanding facts in the- historical development of the
petroleum industry should be considered first. The birth of the
modern petroleum industry in America dates from August 27,
1859, when Col. E. T. Drake brought in the first well in Pennsyl-
vania. The Civil War did not check its growth, so that by 1870
there were two hundred and fifty refineries in operation from
Louisville, Ky., to Portland, Me. In the meantime in 1865,
John D. Rockefeller had begun to refine petroleum on a small
scale. In 1870, a new era in the industry was initiated by the
reorganization of the firm of Rockefeller, Andrews and Flagler
into the Standard Oil Co. of Ohio with a capital stock of one mil-
lion dollars. Although this company was engaged only in re-
fining and marketing, it had a far reaching influence on all
branches of the industry.2
From 1870 until 1911, the history of the petroleum industry
was centered around the development of the Standard Oil Co.
It maintained its dominating position from its beginning.3
In 1906, the Standard concerns controlled most of the refining
and distribution, especially of illuminating oil which was the
I Fuchs, Legal Technique and National Control of the Petroleum Indus-
try (1931) 16 ST. Louis L. REv. 189.
2Logan, The Stabilization of the Petroleum Industry, Bull. 54, OKLA.
GFoL SURV. (1930) 12.
Ibid. pp. 13-14. See also Report of Hepburn Investigating Commit-
tee, New York (1879) 2605.
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principal product of that period.4 However, they did not have a
monopoly of crude oil production either through ownership or
through lease, or through other contractual control of producing
areas. The Standard organization was the largest consumer of
crude for refining purposes, and its pipelines which transported
oil more cheaply than railroads were geographically so situated
that producers were obliged to sell to Standard. Hence, without
the actual ownership of the land and the highly incumbent specu-
lative risk, it was able to control the price of crude oil. Besides
the companies which the Standard Oil Co. actually owned,5 there
were a number of other companies which were so closely asso-
ciated by contract and otherwise as to be in a large measure con-
trolled by it.6
The dissolution in 18927 of the original trust agreement of
the Standard Oil Co. which had been formed in 1882, was of lit-
tle effect in destroying the monopoly, since after the reorganiza-
tion, the control of the company still lay in the hands of a few in-
dividuals.8 The Standard of New Jersey had replaced the Stand-
ard of Ohio as the central corporation. In 1911, the Supreme
4 Report of the Commissioner of Corporations in the Petroleum Industry,
REP. BUREAU OF CORP. (1907) Part I, pp. 13-18. The report of the Bureau
of Corporations found that in 1906, the Standard Oil Co. had 84.2 per cent
of the crude consumption of the country. In output of refined products,
Standard concerns proper, then produced 78.7 per cent of the total for the
country while 7.8 per cent more was produced by closely affiliated concerns,
giving a total of 86.5 per cent. The principal product of that period was
illuminating oil and the Standard is estimated to have had 87 per cent of the
total exports and 88.7 per cent of the domestic marketing of this product.
5 In 1906, the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey controlled through stock
ownership, 10 refining companies, 4 lubricating oil and compound companies,
12 pipe line companies, 1 tank car company, 6 marketing companies, and 16
natural gas companies in active operation in the United States, and 15 com-
panies in active operation in foreign countries.
6 Federal Trade Commission, Petroleum Industry-Prices, Profits and
Competition. SEN. Doc. 61, 70th Cong. 1st Sess. (1928) pp. 64-65.
7 State v. Standard Oil Co. (1892) 49 Ohio 137, 30 N. E. 279. See Dana,
"Monopoly" Under the National Anti-Trust Act (1894) 7 HARv. L. Rsv. 1. c.
348. The arrangement was dissolved because the court held it to be an
ultra vires act as tending to create a monopoly to control prices as well as
production. The acts were held to be contrary to public policy and there-
fore illegal.
8 Report of the Commissioners on the Petroleum Industry, op. cit. Part I,
pp. 79-82. In 1899 the stock of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey was in-
creased for the purpose of taking over as a holding company, the control of
the companies that had been in the trust, some twenty in number. As a
matter of fact, John D. Rockefeller and Henry M. Flagler had virtual con-
trol of, or at least the former, by combining with Flagler or with any one
of several combinations of other stockholders, could control a majority of
the voting stock. Yet, this would have made no difference, since the per-
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Court affirmed 9 the decision of the U. S. Circuit Court in Mis-
souri in finding that the Standard Oil Co. had formed "a com-
bination or conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce in the
various States, Territories, and with other nations." As a re-
sult, the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey distributed the stocks
of its 33 principal subsidiaries to its stockholders in accordance
with the permission given it by the decree. Although the old
Standard passed out of the picture, it influenced indirectly the
subsequent history, especially since the new Standard Companies
still have a considerable control over the petroleum field.
Following the dissolution decree, the Standard group was still
under the control of the stockholders of the former Standard,
but not as a single unit controlled by a holding company. The
change of ownership, however, in a single company to holdings
of stock in many companies with differing possibilities and earn-
ing powers was certain in time to disperse this control.1 0 The
history of these various Standard groups after the dissolution,
therefore, has conformed more or less to the general trends af-
fecting the industry as a whole. Many of the large independent
companies have developed into corporations of considerable size,
and are larger today than some of the larger companies in the
Standard group. The accompanying table indicates the com-
parative strength of the Standard companies in the industry.
(See Figure I)11
Reference to the table will show that five large independent
companies were formed after the dissolution decree of 1911, and
that the investment of each of the other five increased from about
sonalities of the several large holders insured their complete domination of
the organization. See p. 65 of Senate Document 61, 70th Congress, above,
for a table showing a comparison of large holdings of certificates of the
trust of 1882 with large holdings of stock of the Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey of 1899, giving the names of the various holders.
Standard Oil Co. v. U. S. (1911) 221 U. S. 1.
10 Pogue, ECONOMICS OF PETROLEUM (1921). Of the thirty-three com-
panies, eleven were marketing concerns, and after the dissolution, these
companies continued to do business in their respective territories. The de-
cree has been criticized by many lawyers and economists, especially the lat-
ter, who are ready to point out that the factor which had worked to exert
national rather than sectional influence upon the trend of markets and to
establish a general level of petroleum prices, subject only to transportation
and similar normal variations, had been wiped out of existence. However,
the admitted efficiency which characterized the original corporation was not
quite removed by the dissolution decree and is still in evidence in the de-
tached organization. Whether the gross result of the efficiency as a whole
has been seriously lost, so as to have injured substantially the economic
prosperity of the country, is another question.
" Federal Trade Commission, Petroleum Industry-Prices, Profits and
Competition, op. cit. n. 6 above, 61.
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FIGURE I.
Investment (capital stock, bonds, serial notes, and surplus) of 20 petroleum
companies having an investment of $100,000,000 or over in 1926, for 1911, 1925and 1926.
Company 1911 1925 1926
Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey)... 1 $292,000,000 $1,063,903,806 $1,264,161,247
Standard Oil Co. of New York. 75,955,736 480,445,402 629,072,475
Standard Oil Co. of California.... 39,213,195 514,140,342 543,697,627
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) ...... 2 25,217,405 368,383,842 402,835,977
Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corp... 3 328,428,185 336,308,361
The Texas Co .................. 4 43,602,995 277,916,023 292,812,541
Empire Gas & Fuel Co. (Delaware) 3 5 254,036,792 5 284,914,914
Gulf Oil Corp. of Pennsylvania... 25,363,095 260,633,349 284,645,433
Shell Union Oil Corporation ...... 243,583,000 253,660,793
Pan American Petroleum &
Transport Co ................ 8 169,957,530 234,233,941
Tide Water-Associated Oil Co .... 70,660,742 208,068,159 215,567,834
Union Oil Co. of California ..... 71,032,422 150,306,327 183,940,657
Pure Oil Co .................... 10,337,932 6167,671,940 6168,890,149
Humble Oil & Refining Co. 7 ..... 119,577,597 160,161,367
Prairie Oil & Gas Co ............ 853,915,176 139,435,262 150,962,163
Vacuum Oil Co ................. 9 24,167,478 133,014,762 131,170,684
Atlantic Refining Co ............ 10 15,965,748 121,688,578 121,274,910
Prairie Pipe Line Co ............ . 104,971,903 112,955,936
Phillips Petroleum Co ........... 3 91,177,853 105,367,160
Ohio Oil Co .................... 10 44,051,447 96,144,569 101,312,431
Total ................... $791,483,371 $5,293,485,221 $5,977,952,600
1I "High cot of gasoline and other petroleum products," p. 193, hearings beforo a subcommittce
of the Committee on Manufactures, United States Senate, Sixty-seventh Congress, cecond and fourth
sessions.
gIbd. p. 768.
Not in business in 1911.
'June 30, 1911.
5 Year ending November 30.6
Year ending March 31.
7 Controlled by Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey).
3 Includes investment in Prairie Pipe Line Co.
9 Includes $8,238,443 due StandardOil Co. (New Jersey).
10 Computed from statement for December 31, 1912.
200 to 7500 per cent. The Standard companies represent about
sixty per cent of the investment of the twenty companies. Fur-
thermore, while the distribution due to the decree resulted in a
marked decrease in the Standard of New Jersdy's investment,
from the end of 1911 to 1926 it increased 333 per cent.12 That
the other important Standard companies increased tremendously
1 2 Record in U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, above, vol. 7, p. 32.
On December 31, 1906, soon after the dissolution suit was brought, its in-
vestment was $359,400,000, while on December 31, 1911, immediately after
stock in most of the subsidiaries was distributed ratably to stockholders, it
was only $292,000,000.
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FiGuRE H.
Portions of large groups in the industry as measured by different stand-
ard, 1925.
Proportion of Total Proportion
of TotalUnited States in Table
Company
"o__ _ _ _ 0 00 00 0
Standard Groups:
Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey)..
Standard Oil Co. of New York..
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana)....
Standard Oil Co. of California...
Atlantic Refining Co ...........
Prairie Oil & Gas Co ...........
Continental Oil Co ............
Vacuum Oil Co ................
Ohio Oil Co...................
South Penn Oil Co ............
Standard Oil Co. (Ohio) ........
Standard Oil Co. (Kentucky)...
Galena Signal Oil Co. (Penn-
sylvania) ...................
Standard Oil Co. (Kansas) ......
Solar Refining Co ..............
Standard Oil Co. (Nebraska) ....
Total Standard groups .....
Standard Associates:
Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corp..
Tidewater-Associated Oil .......
Total Standard Associates..
Total, both groups ........
Other Large Groups:
The Texas Co .................
Gulf Oil Corporation........
Shell-Union Oil Corporation ....
Total other large groups....
Total Standard and other
groups reporting ........ 66.5
Per
Cent
14.4
10.9
14.7
11.4
2.1
3.8
1.0
3.5
2.2
.3
.9
1.9
47.4 24.5 45.8 43.156.0 42.155.5 67.6 67.6
1.3 1.4 3.5 5.0 2.9 2.8 3.4 7.0 2.8
10.2 3.4 4.4 3.4 2.1 5.8 3.3 4.8 4.5
11.5 4.8 7.9 8.4 5.0 8.6 6.7 11.8 7.3
58.9 29.3 53.7 51.56 1.0 50.762.2 79.4 74.9
1.1 2.8 4.7 5.9 4.7 3.0 4.4 7.4 10.7
5.0 4.8 4.9 4.8 4.4 4.2 6.9 6.3 9.51.5 6.3 4.9 4.4 4.3 5.9 1.7 6.9 4.9
7.613.914.515.113.413.113.0 20.6 25.1
43.2168.2166.6174.4163.8175.21100. 0 100.0
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during the same period should be noted 18 The second table
(Figure II) shows the comparative positions of the Standard
companies in relation to the whole industry and to the independ-
ent companies.14
The purpose of this table is two-fold. First, it calls attention
to the substantial decrease that has taken place in the proportion
of control of certain branches of the industry by the Standard
companies in the aggregate, and secondly, it shows the extent to
which there is still control over the industry by a few large
groups. It should be noted that the Standard groups combined
with their associates control only 29 per cent of the crude pro-
duction and roughly one-half of the refined products. In 1904,
the companies under the complete control of the Standard of
New Jersey produced nearly 80 per cent of all the refined prod-
ucts. Also, at the time of the compilation of this table, the
most important single company in the industry except for
crude petroleum produced and proven acreage controlled was the
Standard of New Jersey. The largest companies as listed in the
table have a combined output of between 65 and 75 per cent of
all refined products. While there has been a marked dispersion
of control of the refining industry in the last two decades, there
has been equally as strong a tendency toward concentration in
control of natural resources. In contrast to the policy of the old
Standard Company, the new Standard groups are now among
the largest holders of proven acreage, their combined holdings
at the end of 1925 being 47 per cent of the total of such acreage
and practically the same as their combined proportion of refined
products. While this acreage is not all in rich producing areas,
consolidations since the end of 1925 have brought under the con-
trol of particular Standard groups other areas that would sub-
stantially raise the average quality of the holdings.
At this point, it would be appropriate to outline in a general
way the structure of the petroleum industry as a whole. The oil
industry is divided into four divisions: production, transporta-
tion, refining and marketing. Most of the larger companies are
complete in the sense that they perform all four functions. So
much capital is required in the transportation and refining busi-
ness that only a few companies, compared to the number in the
Z3 The Standard Oil Companies of New York, California and Indiana
showed marked increases during the same period, 728, 1287 and 1407 per
cent, respectively. This was due mainly to mergers and acquisitions. Also,
it should be noted that the Prairie Pipe Line Co., the only pipe line com-
pany in the country with an investment in excess of $100,000,000, increased
390 per cent.
24 Federal Trade Commission, Petroleum Industry-Prices, Profits and
Competition, op. cit. n. 6 above, 77.
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other divisions, are engaged in these. Most of the oil is pro-
duced, transported, refined, and marketed by complete organiza-
tions each of which is divided into subsidiaries which confine
themselves to only one branch of the industry.
According to estimates made by the Oil and Gas Journal,15
there were invested in the petroleum industry in the United
States in 1927 about $11,300,000,000. This sum was divided
among the four branches as follows: production, $5,000,000,000;
transportation, $1,800,000,000; marketing, $1,500,000,000; re-
fining, $3,000,000,000. In the transportation division $900,000,-
000 are invested in pipelines, $300,000,000 in. tank cars and
$600,000,000 in tank steamers.
In regard to the internal mechanism of the corporate structure
of the petroleum industry, an extensive survey by the Federal
Trade Commission showed that the stock-holding was well di-
versified with comparatively very few large holders controlling
much stock in several companies.16 The number of directors in
each company varies from only three for some of the smaller
ones to approximately twenty-five for several of the larger ones.
Although the survey showed some concentration 17 of directo-
rates in the hands of a few persons, only four instances were
found of an interlocking of directors such as would tend sub-
stantially to unify control of any large part of the petroleum in-
dustry, and none that would tend by this means to give control
of the industry as a whole. While the attendance by stockhold-
ers at meetings of a company is usually small,'s most of the im-
15 Anderson, The Oil Industry's Answer Today, OIL AND GAS J., Dec. 1,
1927, p. 113.
16 Federal Trade Commission, Petroleum Industry-Prices, Profits and
Competition, op. cit. n. 6 above, 79. Out of a total of 9560 holders, 163
held 1 per cent or more of the voting stock of each of two or more com-
panies but had not more than one holding each as much as one per cent.
None of the other 8,886 reported holders had stock in more than one com-
pany, and only 2,827 of them were holders of as much as one per cent of
the stock of their respective companies.
17 Ibid. Out of 446 companies furnishing organization schedules, there
were reported a total of over 2100 directors, an average of roughly, over
five directors to a company. Nineteen of this number held directorships in
two or more companies in nominally opposing groups, none, however, being
connected with more than two such groups, and 160 held directorships in
two or more companies in the same group. These 179 directors held 458
directorships, and the companies in which they were interested cover more
than 70 per cent oi me industry aside from the production of crude
petroleum.
18 Ibid. For the oil and refining companies whose records were examined
the attendance was found usually to be under 10, and some of the stock-
holders' meetings of the Continental Oil Co. were held by a single individual.
For companies of the Standard Oil Co. groups, the attendance in persons
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portant voting at meetings is done by proxies. This means of
voting constitutes on the average 60 to 90 per cent of the voting
done at most meetings. 9
As for mergers, one need only observe the newspapers and
current trade periodicals to appreciate how often and how many
mergers are taking place in the petroleum industry.20 The re-
cent and very important acquisition by the Standard Oil Com-
pany of New York of the Vacuum Company was sanctioned by
the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in Feb-
ruary, 1931.21 In the records of the parties to the suit, there
were disclosed several very pertinent facts. It was shown that
the Royal Dutch Shell and its subsidiaries, controlled in the main
by British and Dutch stockholders, had produced 15 per cent of
the world's petroleum in 1929. Most of its gasoline came from
Venezuela. The figures in the opinion 22 indicated further that
the Shell Company was first in crude production (1930) of
petroleum in the United States, Texas Co., second, Standard of
New Jersey, third, Gulf, fourth, Standard of Indiana, fifth, and
Socony and Vacuum combined, sixth. In daily refining capacity,
Standard of New Jersey ranked first, Shell second, Standard of
Indiana third, and Socony and Vacuum fourth.2
A brief summary of the picture thus far presented would indi-
cate a swing from control of the petroleum industry by one com-
for the years 1922 to 1926 ranged from an average of four for the Stand-
ard of Nebraska to ten for the Atlantic Refining Co. The stockholders of
the Texas Co. manifested the greatest interest in the affairs of the com-
pany with an average attendance of 72 at their latest reported meeting.
This latter company is reported to have 30,000 stockholders in 47 states,
the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, Philippine Islands, Porto Rico,
Canal Zone, and a few stockholders in foreign countries.
19 Federal Trade Commission, Petroleum Industry-Prices, Profits and
Competition, op. cit. n. 6 above. See table on p. 82.
20 Press dispatches of January 9, 1930, carried the announcement of the
offer of the Standard Oil Co. of New York to acquire the White Eagle Oil
and Refining Co.
21 U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (D. C.E.D.Mo. 1931) 47 F. (2d)
288. The court pointed out that because of the complementary characters
of the two companies it was in the interests of fair competition that they
be permitted to compete as a unit with the other companies doing both
nation-wide and foreign business. The Standard Company of New York
does a nation-wide business in gasoline and fuel oil while the Vacuum Com-
pany does a comparatively small American business and a vast foreign
business in high grade lubricants.22See U. S. v. Standard Oil Company of New York, above, 1. o. 311, 312,
313.
23 Ibid. Of all the petroleum companies, 18 are doing business in 13 or
more states, 12 in 20 or more states, 8 in 30 or more states, 5 in 40 or more
states, and 2 (Texas Corporation and Royal Dutch Shell) are doing busi-
ness in all the states.
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pany twenty years ago, followed by disintegration into many
smaller units, to the control of the industry by several very large
companies. Furthermore, while twenty years ago the Standard
Company was responsible for approximately 80 per cent of the
refined products, today, the separate Standard companies in the
aggregate control almost 25 per cent of the crude production and
approximately 45 per cent of the output of refined products.
About half of the crude is still produced by a very large number
of individuals or small companies, but more than two-thirds of
the "proven acreage" of oil bearing lands of the country is in
the hands of nine Standard Companies and six independent
companies.
A consideration of the facts summarized heretofore may be an
aid to the formulation of some plan for stabilization. The plans
which have been suggested by various authorities are too numer-
ous and involved to be considered here. A brief study of some
of these plans, which may be found in recent volumes of the
Congressional Record and in other governmental documents, law
journals, periodicals and treatises, will disclose that most of the
solutions center their attention on the production end of the
industry. From the economic standpoint, however, it would
seem that possibly more effective control might be exercised
through the refiners who are fewer in number. A national plan
for cooperation among them would transcend irrelevant state
lines. The resulting lack of a market for excess production of
crude might well induce a voluntary control in the oil fields,
which militia are now being used to enforce sporadically. The
necessary revision of the anti-trust laws and the establishment
of suitable regulation over a consoltdated petroleum industry
constitute a major challenge to statesmanship.
H. ROBERT SHAMPAINE, '32.
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF DEFECTIVELY
ORGANIZED CORPORATIONS
The approach to the problem of the judicial treatment of de-
fectively organized corporations is one hedged about by many
conflicting ideas and many concurrent considerations of which
notice must be taken.' First of all it may be said that from the
I The following factors must be considered: the nature of the body which
has presumably been brought into existence; for what purpose the question
of corporate existence is being urged; the nature of the defect in the cor-
porate structure, and whether or not the particular defects are regarded in
that jurisdiction as supermandatory, mandatory or merely directory re-
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